Voluntary Appearance

Every serious student of criminal procedure knows that before the court can act on any pending motion or incident before it, it is necessary that it should have first acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The textbook theory on the jurisdiction, which is the authority of the court to hear and try a particular offense, over the person of the accused is accomplished in two modes, namely through the coercive process by way of arrest and voluntary surrender. The thinking then was that any action made by the court before it has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused is susceptible to attack direct or otherwise.

The Supreme Court has somewhat relaxed this school of thought in several cases by way of adding a new mode of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused. This is by way of voluntary appearance wherein the accused can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, even without arrest or voluntary surrender, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused by his voluntary appearance and to judicially consider any pending incident for its resolution.

There is voluntary appearance when, for example, the accused files a “motion to quash”, or “motion for re-investigation,” or “motion for judicial determination of probable cause” and the like. In these instances, the court may be able to grant affirmative reliefs or even dismiss the case against him, notwithstanding the fact that he is still at large. Simply put, it is not always essential that jurisdiction over the person of the accused be first acquired by the court before it can deny or grant a motion, or issue orders and processes.

The rule, however, is not absolute as it is subject to a certain well defined exception, that is, in the matter for application for bail or the reduction thereof, which mandates that the living body of the accused must be first in the custody of the law. This is so because the purpose of the application for bail is obviously designed to secure the provisional or temporary liberty of the accused and the same cannot be availed of unless and until the custody of the accused has been secured by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. In a stunning array of fresh insights the Supreme Court has once again made clear an otherwise hazy and murky aspect in our criminal procedure. By Judge Globert J. Justalero