Illegal Possession of Firearms

With the proliferation of unlicensed firearms in our midst, it is not surprising that many a crime had been committed by the malefactors armed with handguns, and sometimes with deadly or near fatal consequences. It is so frustrating to know that authorities’ efforts to curb the rising rate of criminality have remained an exercise in futility. Its pernicious effects to the peace loving citizenry have brought serious doubts on their government’s capability to restrain it like a fervent zealot out to bring down the monarchy of the olden time.

Undoubtedly, the government has not been remiss in addressing this problem, since legislations have been passed to curb or at least contain the pernicious effects of unwarranted increased in gun related criminal acts. Not to be outdone, the judiciary has also its own fair share in eliminating if not, minimizing the evil consequences of the rapid increase of unlicensed firearms. The court records are replete with decisions convicting the accused for the violation of the law penalizing unauthorized carriage of loose handguns whether as a crime by itself or as aggravating circumstance.

The question that has bedeviled legal experts since the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, otherwise commonly known as the “Illegal possession of firearms” on July 6, 1997, and stirred up academic and scholarly debates is whether or not the mere filing of an Information for “other crime/s” or more specifically for “Gun Ban violations,” against the accused bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm. This came about because of a seemingly innocent phrase in the subject law, but nonetheless, has been the topic of various verbal intercourses as well as multifarious jurisprudence, and in its innocuousness, it provides that: Provided, however, “That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.”

In a case of relative recency, the Supreme Court has the occasion and finally tamed, like a restless wind inside the letter box, conflicting views on the subject when it ruled that the accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The Highest Court made it clear that the word “committed” in the subject law should be taken in its ordinary signification, which necessarily connotes a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission of the accused in open Court.

In other words, other than those crimes specifically enumerated in the law, like homicide, murder, rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’ etat, the accused may be prosecuted, tried and convicted for the “other crimes” as well as for illegal possession of firearm, unless the accused has been convicted by final judgment or has pleaded guilty, of the “other crime” and which case it would be a bar and would preclude the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Resultantly, there is no legal prohibition for the accused to be prosecuted and convicted for illegal possession of firearm and “other crime” unless and until the accused has been convicted by final judgment of the said “other crime.”

It is readily apparent, therefore, that if the accused is prosecuted for the offense which is listed under R.A. 8294, then any Information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed since it is no longer the subject of separate and distinct prosecution. The reason is not difficult to see as the law itself so mandates that the particularity of illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, and to be considered either as an aggravating circumstance of the crime of murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’ etat. By Judge Globert J. Justalero