“I, ____________________ do solemnly swear that ... I will delay no man for money or malice ...” So help me God.” (Attorney’s Oath, Form 28, Rules of Court).
“Moreover, the omissions of respondent violated Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Judges are mandated to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. In other words, judges should never cause judicial delay.
Delay derails the administration of justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those causes in which all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility. More than this, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly as time elapses between the original fact and its judicial determination. If the facts are not fully and accurately determined, then the wisest judge cannot distinguish between merit and demerit. If courts do not get the facts right, there is little chance for their judgment to be right.” (Orocio v. Roxas, 562 SCRA 347, 357 - 2008)
“ “Prolonged and unjustified delay is the major weakness of our judicial system today.” Though there is a consensus that delay is a pervasive and long-standing problem facing America’s trial courts, there is great disagreement over what is actually meant by “delay”. For research purposes, it often means the age of cases or docket backlog; to the practicing lawyer, delay is the time from announcement that the case is ready for trial until the court can reach the matter; for litigants, the public, and reformers, delay is more broadly defined to include the time from the filing to disposition. Largely depending upon the definition used by the commentator, “delay” is either a cause or a result of the massive congestion in our courts. However categorized, delay has far-reaching and long-lasting effects not only on the litigants but on the administration of justice itself. Delay brings the system of justice into disrepute and breeds disrespect for law. “Justice delayed is justice denied” may sound trite, but the plaintiff and the defendant who must wait from two to five years for the disposition of their lawsuit not only suffer frustration but either or both may suffer injustice in the outcome as well. A party’s rights may change substantially as a result of the death, the disappearance, or the dimming memory, of a witness. The sustained anxiety of the litigants and their resultant dissatisfaction with the legal system are sufficient reasons to require prompt and effective measures for the more expeditious handling of civil disputes. Chief Justice Burger has observed:
There is nothing incompatible between efficiency and justice. Inefficient courts cause delay and expense, and diminish the value of the judgment Small litigants, who cannot manipulate the system, are often exploited - to use the words of Moofield Story, a former president of the American Bar Association - by the litigant ‘with the longest purse.’ . . . Efficiency - like the trial itself - is not an end in itself. It has as its objective the very purpose of the whole system - to do justice. Inefficiency drains the value of even a just result either by delay or excessive cost, or both.” (Civil Trial Manual 2, 1980). By Atty. Cesar T. Tirol
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Summary Judgment in Annulment of Marriages Case A Taboo
It is on the principle that marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution and as the foundation of the family, the State is duty bound to protect and preserve it. In obedience to this legal truism that “judgment on the pleadings” or “summary judgment”, or even “confession of judgment,” for that matter has no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as well as in annulment of marriage. The rationale is not difficult to see because the grounds for the dissolution of marriages must be proved by preponderance of evidence by the party invoking the same through the trial personally conducted by the Judge.
This is precisely the reason behind that both the Civil Code of the Philippines and the Family Code of the Philippines prescribe that the Court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for and in behalf of the State. It is to be noted that the mere submission by the public prosecutor of his report that no collusion exists between the parties would not mean the termination of the State’s participation in the proceedings. The public prosecutor, whose role among other things is the preservation of marriage, should actively participate in the trial of the case and to subject the petitioner’s witnesses to extensive and exhaustive cross examination purposely to see to it that there is no suppression as well as fabrication of evidence.
If there is still any doubt as to the propriety in the application of “summary judgment” or “judgment on the pleadings” or “confession of judgment” it has been laid to rest by the promulgation of the “Rule on Declaration of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” As it is written, the Rule is explicit in its mandate that the Judge should personally conduct the trial of the case and there should be no delegation of the reception of evidence before a commissioner save as to matter involving property relations of the parties. Putting a stamp of clarity like an unexpected thundercloud looming in the horizon, the Rule also provides that no “judgment on the pleadings” “summary judgment” or “confession of judgment shall be allowed, which means that the grounds for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage must be duly proved and established.
In the strict observance of the State’s policy to maintain the Filipino family as a foundation of the nations, the law requires in no uncertain terms the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General in the trial of the case and not like a puppet whose string is being pulled to nod agreement to everything the petitioner says. In this way it could ensure that the interest of the State is fully represented and protected in the proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriage by way of preventing the presentation of fabricated or suppressed evidence. By Judge Globert J. Justalero
This is precisely the reason behind that both the Civil Code of the Philippines and the Family Code of the Philippines prescribe that the Court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for and in behalf of the State. It is to be noted that the mere submission by the public prosecutor of his report that no collusion exists between the parties would not mean the termination of the State’s participation in the proceedings. The public prosecutor, whose role among other things is the preservation of marriage, should actively participate in the trial of the case and to subject the petitioner’s witnesses to extensive and exhaustive cross examination purposely to see to it that there is no suppression as well as fabrication of evidence.
If there is still any doubt as to the propriety in the application of “summary judgment” or “judgment on the pleadings” or “confession of judgment” it has been laid to rest by the promulgation of the “Rule on Declaration of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” As it is written, the Rule is explicit in its mandate that the Judge should personally conduct the trial of the case and there should be no delegation of the reception of evidence before a commissioner save as to matter involving property relations of the parties. Putting a stamp of clarity like an unexpected thundercloud looming in the horizon, the Rule also provides that no “judgment on the pleadings” “summary judgment” or “confession of judgment shall be allowed, which means that the grounds for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage must be duly proved and established.
In the strict observance of the State’s policy to maintain the Filipino family as a foundation of the nations, the law requires in no uncertain terms the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General in the trial of the case and not like a puppet whose string is being pulled to nod agreement to everything the petitioner says. In this way it could ensure that the interest of the State is fully represented and protected in the proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriage by way of preventing the presentation of fabricated or suppressed evidence. By Judge Globert J. Justalero
Party- In- Interest in Annulment of Marriages
There are some nagging questions that have been confronting practitioners before the Family Courts especially on the cases of annulment of marriage. Foremost of which is the issue on the real-party-interest who can initiate an action to sever the marital bonds. It has been the rule and practice that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage as the same is being reserved solely and exclusively to the husband or wife. The importance of the real party in interest cannot be overemphasized, like that Dutch boy with his thumb plugging the hole in the dike trying to hold the tides.
This is clear under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages by making it exclusively the right of the spouses to initiate the action. Simply put, such petition cannot be filed by the compulsory heirs or intestate heirs of the spouses for the simple reason that they have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor. If ever, they can inquire into the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a separate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the proper courts. More so, neither the State can institute an action to nullify marriages for the logical ground that the primary and primordial concern of the government is to preserve marriages and not to seek their dissolution.
A methodical examination, however, of the present Rule would show that it extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. Further, the new Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before the date of its operation on March 15, 2003 although the marriage subject matter of the case is within the coverage of the Family Code. In other words, in the event that the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration and in that case a direct action to declare the marriage as void may be filed and not necessarily in a settlement of the estate proceedings. But the catch is the same can only be filed by the real party in interest purposely to protect their successional rights.
This brings us to the question as to who is the real party-in-interest who can bring an action to declare the marriage as null and void in the event that the marriage was solemnized under the auspices of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Party-in- interest as understood in our civil law means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case. In a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, it must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. For instance, under the law on succession, the children, as compulsory heirs, and by operation of law have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
In the presence of the compulsory heirs, it is readily apparent that brothers and sisters as well as other collateral relatives of the deceased spouse are not the real party-in-interest to bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the latter. This is so because the presence of the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased spouse who are considered as compulsory heirs precludes succession by collateral relatives and their right is as ephemeral as the moonlight that illuminates the night. The impression is only in the possibility that there are no compulsory heirs that collateral relatives, as real party-in-interest, may bring an action to declare marriage as void since they shall be called upon to succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. By Judge Globert J. Justalero
This is clear under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages by making it exclusively the right of the spouses to initiate the action. Simply put, such petition cannot be filed by the compulsory heirs or intestate heirs of the spouses for the simple reason that they have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor. If ever, they can inquire into the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a separate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the proper courts. More so, neither the State can institute an action to nullify marriages for the logical ground that the primary and primordial concern of the government is to preserve marriages and not to seek their dissolution.
A methodical examination, however, of the present Rule would show that it extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. Further, the new Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before the date of its operation on March 15, 2003 although the marriage subject matter of the case is within the coverage of the Family Code. In other words, in the event that the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration and in that case a direct action to declare the marriage as void may be filed and not necessarily in a settlement of the estate proceedings. But the catch is the same can only be filed by the real party in interest purposely to protect their successional rights.
This brings us to the question as to who is the real party-in-interest who can bring an action to declare the marriage as null and void in the event that the marriage was solemnized under the auspices of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Party-in- interest as understood in our civil law means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case. In a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, it must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. For instance, under the law on succession, the children, as compulsory heirs, and by operation of law have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
In the presence of the compulsory heirs, it is readily apparent that brothers and sisters as well as other collateral relatives of the deceased spouse are not the real party-in-interest to bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the latter. This is so because the presence of the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased spouse who are considered as compulsory heirs precludes succession by collateral relatives and their right is as ephemeral as the moonlight that illuminates the night. The impression is only in the possibility that there are no compulsory heirs that collateral relatives, as real party-in-interest, may bring an action to declare marriage as void since they shall be called upon to succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. By Judge Globert J. Justalero
Monday, July 27, 2009
Illegal Possession of Firearms
With the proliferation of unlicensed firearms in our midst, it is not surprising that many a crime had been committed by the malefactors armed with handguns, and sometimes with deadly or near fatal consequences. It is so frustrating to know that authorities’ efforts to curb the rising rate of criminality have remained an exercise in futility. Its pernicious effects to the peace loving citizenry have brought serious doubts on their government’s capability to restrain it like a fervent zealot out to bring down the monarchy of the olden time.
Undoubtedly, the government has not been remiss in addressing this problem, since legislations have been passed to curb or at least contain the pernicious effects of unwarranted increased in gun related criminal acts. Not to be outdone, the judiciary has also its own fair share in eliminating if not, minimizing the evil consequences of the rapid increase of unlicensed firearms. The court records are replete with decisions convicting the accused for the violation of the law penalizing unauthorized carriage of loose handguns whether as a crime by itself or as aggravating circumstance.
The question that has bedeviled legal experts since the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, otherwise commonly known as the “Illegal possession of firearms” on July 6, 1997, and stirred up academic and scholarly debates is whether or not the mere filing of an Information for “other crime/s” or more specifically for “Gun Ban violations,” against the accused bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm. This came about because of a seemingly innocent phrase in the subject law, but nonetheless, has been the topic of various verbal intercourses as well as multifarious jurisprudence, and in its innocuousness, it provides that: Provided, however, “That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.”
In a case of relative recency, the Supreme Court has the occasion and finally tamed, like a restless wind inside the letter box, conflicting views on the subject when it ruled that the accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The Highest Court made it clear that the word “committed” in the subject law should be taken in its ordinary signification, which necessarily connotes a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission of the accused in open Court.
In other words, other than those crimes specifically enumerated in the law, like homicide, murder, rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’ etat, the accused may be prosecuted, tried and convicted for the “other crimes” as well as for illegal possession of firearm, unless the accused has been convicted by final judgment or has pleaded guilty, of the “other crime” and which case it would be a bar and would preclude the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Resultantly, there is no legal prohibition for the accused to be prosecuted and convicted for illegal possession of firearm and “other crime” unless and until the accused has been convicted by final judgment of the said “other crime.”
It is readily apparent, therefore, that if the accused is prosecuted for the offense which is listed under R.A. 8294, then any Information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed since it is no longer the subject of separate and distinct prosecution. The reason is not difficult to see as the law itself so mandates that the particularity of illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, and to be considered either as an aggravating circumstance of the crime of murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’ etat. By Judge Globert J. Justalero
Undoubtedly, the government has not been remiss in addressing this problem, since legislations have been passed to curb or at least contain the pernicious effects of unwarranted increased in gun related criminal acts. Not to be outdone, the judiciary has also its own fair share in eliminating if not, minimizing the evil consequences of the rapid increase of unlicensed firearms. The court records are replete with decisions convicting the accused for the violation of the law penalizing unauthorized carriage of loose handguns whether as a crime by itself or as aggravating circumstance.
The question that has bedeviled legal experts since the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, otherwise commonly known as the “Illegal possession of firearms” on July 6, 1997, and stirred up academic and scholarly debates is whether or not the mere filing of an Information for “other crime/s” or more specifically for “Gun Ban violations,” against the accused bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm. This came about because of a seemingly innocent phrase in the subject law, but nonetheless, has been the topic of various verbal intercourses as well as multifarious jurisprudence, and in its innocuousness, it provides that: Provided, however, “That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.”
In a case of relative recency, the Supreme Court has the occasion and finally tamed, like a restless wind inside the letter box, conflicting views on the subject when it ruled that the accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The Highest Court made it clear that the word “committed” in the subject law should be taken in its ordinary signification, which necessarily connotes a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission of the accused in open Court.
In other words, other than those crimes specifically enumerated in the law, like homicide, murder, rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’ etat, the accused may be prosecuted, tried and convicted for the “other crimes” as well as for illegal possession of firearm, unless the accused has been convicted by final judgment or has pleaded guilty, of the “other crime” and which case it would be a bar and would preclude the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Resultantly, there is no legal prohibition for the accused to be prosecuted and convicted for illegal possession of firearm and “other crime” unless and until the accused has been convicted by final judgment of the said “other crime.”
It is readily apparent, therefore, that if the accused is prosecuted for the offense which is listed under R.A. 8294, then any Information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed since it is no longer the subject of separate and distinct prosecution. The reason is not difficult to see as the law itself so mandates that the particularity of illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, and to be considered either as an aggravating circumstance of the crime of murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’ etat. By Judge Globert J. Justalero
Thursday, July 16, 2009
Voluntary Appearance
Every serious student of criminal procedure knows that before the court can act on any pending motion or incident before it, it is necessary that it should have first acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The textbook theory on the jurisdiction, which is the authority of the court to hear and try a particular offense, over the person of the accused is accomplished in two modes, namely through the coercive process by way of arrest and voluntary surrender. The thinking then was that any action made by the court before it has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused is susceptible to attack direct or otherwise.
The Supreme Court has somewhat relaxed this school of thought in several cases by way of adding a new mode of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused. This is by way of voluntary appearance wherein the accused can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, even without arrest or voluntary surrender, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused by his voluntary appearance and to judicially consider any pending incident for its resolution.
There is voluntary appearance when, for example, the accused files a “motion to quash”, or “motion for re-investigation,” or “motion for judicial determination of probable cause” and the like. In these instances, the court may be able to grant affirmative reliefs or even dismiss the case against him, notwithstanding the fact that he is still at large. Simply put, it is not always essential that jurisdiction over the person of the accused be first acquired by the court before it can deny or grant a motion, or issue orders and processes.
The rule, however, is not absolute as it is subject to a certain well defined exception, that is, in the matter for application for bail or the reduction thereof, which mandates that the living body of the accused must be first in the custody of the law. This is so because the purpose of the application for bail is obviously designed to secure the provisional or temporary liberty of the accused and the same cannot be availed of unless and until the custody of the accused has been secured by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. In a stunning array of fresh insights the Supreme Court has once again made clear an otherwise hazy and murky aspect in our criminal procedure. By Judge Globert J. Justalero
The Supreme Court has somewhat relaxed this school of thought in several cases by way of adding a new mode of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused. This is by way of voluntary appearance wherein the accused can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, even without arrest or voluntary surrender, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused by his voluntary appearance and to judicially consider any pending incident for its resolution.
There is voluntary appearance when, for example, the accused files a “motion to quash”, or “motion for re-investigation,” or “motion for judicial determination of probable cause” and the like. In these instances, the court may be able to grant affirmative reliefs or even dismiss the case against him, notwithstanding the fact that he is still at large. Simply put, it is not always essential that jurisdiction over the person of the accused be first acquired by the court before it can deny or grant a motion, or issue orders and processes.
The rule, however, is not absolute as it is subject to a certain well defined exception, that is, in the matter for application for bail or the reduction thereof, which mandates that the living body of the accused must be first in the custody of the law. This is so because the purpose of the application for bail is obviously designed to secure the provisional or temporary liberty of the accused and the same cannot be availed of unless and until the custody of the accused has been secured by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. In a stunning array of fresh insights the Supreme Court has once again made clear an otherwise hazy and murky aspect in our criminal procedure. By Judge Globert J. Justalero
Law suit looming over Calajunan dumpsite
ILOILO CITY—Environmental group, Global Legal Action on Climate Change is warning City Hall it could be sued for maintaining an open dumpsite despite the ban.
Unfazed, Mayor Jerry Trenas said that the City will not close the dumpsite in Brgy. Calajunan, Mandurriao district, adding that it has the nod of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
“It’s okay with me. We will just answer the complaint,” the Mayor said in a text message.
The local chapter of GLACC wrote Trenas, reminding him of the prohibition against open dumpsites under Republic Act 9003, a nine-year-old law governing the disposal of solid wastes in the country.
“We have observed that our City has not complied with the provisions of the Law on Solid Waste Management: Maintenance of an Open Dumpsite at Brgy. Calajunan, Mandurriao, Iloilo City since 2001 despite the enactment and passage of RA 9003,” the GLACC-Iloilo chapter said in its July 7, 2009 letter to Trenas.
“We respectfully request that you take measures to correct the situation within thirty (30) days from receipt of this letter,” the group further said in its letter. The 30-day period ticked off July 8 this year, when the Office of the Mayor received the letter.
The letter, respectful it may be of Trenas, warned the mayor “that should no serious effort be taken by your Office to correct the situation we will indorse the matter to the Office of the Environmental Ombudsman for its appropriate action and we will also file appropriate actions before competent Court to compel your Office to comply with the provisions of RA 9003.”
Copies of the letter were furnished the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources regional office 6, the Office of the Environmental Ombudsman, and the punong barangay of Calajunan, where the City had been maintaining its open dumpsite for several years already.
At the same time, the GLACC is also requesting DENR to monitor City Hall’s compliance, and to submit to them a report on the extent of the City’s compliance with the Solid Waste Management Act.
The letter is a follow up on the earlier request by the group on the different government agencies for the enforcement of the country’s environmental laws, which highlighted the local celebration of the World Environment Day last June 5.
CITY HALL NOT BALKING
The Mayor, described by his critics as lacking in political will, would not give in to the demand of GLACC.
“The DENR has given its nod for the continued operation of the dumpsite,” the Mayor said. “It’s okay with me, we’ll just answer that,” he stressed.
“If the court orders us to close down the dumpsite, then that’s not going to be a problem, we will stop collecting garbage; or if they want, we’ll give to them the garbage we have collected,” Trenas jested.
What the GLACC does not understand, he said, is the immensity of the task and the cost involved in converting the open dumpsite into a sanitary landfill.
Thirty-days is just too little a time for us to convert it into a sanitary landfill, he said.
The City’s Solid Waste Management Board is in the thick of preparing a technical report and plans for the construction of a sanitary landfill in a 5-hectare portion of the Calajunan dumpsite. The German aid agency GTZ is helping the City in preparing the plans for the construction of sanitary landfill.
At present, the mountains of garbage in the Calajunan dumpsite is gradually covered with earth, Trenas said. It’s now a ‘transition dumpsite’
Moreover, the mayor mentioned the financial requirements for the construction of a sanitary landfill. For every hectare, around P50-70 million is needed. “And we’re going to need about five hectares,” he pointed out
At the same time, the Mayor defended his administration’s gains in dealing with solid waste, saying that the City’s Solid Waste Management Board was awarded the best for Visayas region.
The DENR is a member of the SWMB; and to GLACC’s request on the environment agency to monitor the City’s compliance, the mayor sees no problem.
“The DENR is a member of SWMB, they know what the City is doing,” Trenas said. By Ronilo Ladrido Pamonag
Unfazed, Mayor Jerry Trenas said that the City will not close the dumpsite in Brgy. Calajunan, Mandurriao district, adding that it has the nod of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
“It’s okay with me. We will just answer the complaint,” the Mayor said in a text message.
The local chapter of GLACC wrote Trenas, reminding him of the prohibition against open dumpsites under Republic Act 9003, a nine-year-old law governing the disposal of solid wastes in the country.
“We have observed that our City has not complied with the provisions of the Law on Solid Waste Management: Maintenance of an Open Dumpsite at Brgy. Calajunan, Mandurriao, Iloilo City since 2001 despite the enactment and passage of RA 9003,” the GLACC-Iloilo chapter said in its July 7, 2009 letter to Trenas.
“We respectfully request that you take measures to correct the situation within thirty (30) days from receipt of this letter,” the group further said in its letter. The 30-day period ticked off July 8 this year, when the Office of the Mayor received the letter.
The letter, respectful it may be of Trenas, warned the mayor “that should no serious effort be taken by your Office to correct the situation we will indorse the matter to the Office of the Environmental Ombudsman for its appropriate action and we will also file appropriate actions before competent Court to compel your Office to comply with the provisions of RA 9003.”
Copies of the letter were furnished the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources regional office 6, the Office of the Environmental Ombudsman, and the punong barangay of Calajunan, where the City had been maintaining its open dumpsite for several years already.
At the same time, the GLACC is also requesting DENR to monitor City Hall’s compliance, and to submit to them a report on the extent of the City’s compliance with the Solid Waste Management Act.
The letter is a follow up on the earlier request by the group on the different government agencies for the enforcement of the country’s environmental laws, which highlighted the local celebration of the World Environment Day last June 5.
CITY HALL NOT BALKING
The Mayor, described by his critics as lacking in political will, would not give in to the demand of GLACC.
“The DENR has given its nod for the continued operation of the dumpsite,” the Mayor said. “It’s okay with me, we’ll just answer that,” he stressed.
“If the court orders us to close down the dumpsite, then that’s not going to be a problem, we will stop collecting garbage; or if they want, we’ll give to them the garbage we have collected,” Trenas jested.
What the GLACC does not understand, he said, is the immensity of the task and the cost involved in converting the open dumpsite into a sanitary landfill.
Thirty-days is just too little a time for us to convert it into a sanitary landfill, he said.
The City’s Solid Waste Management Board is in the thick of preparing a technical report and plans for the construction of a sanitary landfill in a 5-hectare portion of the Calajunan dumpsite. The German aid agency GTZ is helping the City in preparing the plans for the construction of sanitary landfill.
At present, the mountains of garbage in the Calajunan dumpsite is gradually covered with earth, Trenas said. It’s now a ‘transition dumpsite’
Moreover, the mayor mentioned the financial requirements for the construction of a sanitary landfill. For every hectare, around P50-70 million is needed. “And we’re going to need about five hectares,” he pointed out
At the same time, the Mayor defended his administration’s gains in dealing with solid waste, saying that the City’s Solid Waste Management Board was awarded the best for Visayas region.
The DENR is a member of the SWMB; and to GLACC’s request on the environment agency to monitor the City’s compliance, the mayor sees no problem.
“The DENR is a member of SWMB, they know what the City is doing,” Trenas said. By Ronilo Ladrido Pamonag
Friday, July 10, 2009
38 Iloilo Graduates Passed the 2008 Bar Exams
Thirty eight (38) new lawyers from the three (3) law schools in Iloilo City joined the elite club of legal practitioners after passing the 2008 Bar Examinations. They are among the 1,310 successful examinees out of the 6,364 who took the said exam touted to be the most difficult of its kind in the country. The passing percentage for this year is 20.58%.
The new Ilonggo lawyers are as follows: From Central Philippine University (CPU) College of Law – Atty. Felizardo D. Amigable, Jr., Atty. Maricel F. Bermejo, Atty. Jeremy D. Delfin, Atty. Felix G. Guarnes, Jr., Atty. Bellatrix O. Legaspi, Atty. Gladys Pearl T. Palabrica, Atty. Erlyn M. Pegarido, Atty. Risha Mae L. Suelo and Atty. Nasty Jones S. Sumagaysay.
From the University of Iloilo (UI) College of Law– Atty. JP Anthony D. Cuñada, Atty. Hernando C. Galvez, Atty. Keenan Rhys Y. Jurilla, and Atty. Geony P. Licera.
From the University of San Augustin (USA) College of Law – Iloilo – Atty. Ma. Carolina T. Advincula, Atty. Princess May Alcarde, Atty. Jelou Almalbis, Atty. Francis Athanasius Ampig, Atty. Maynard Caballero, Atty. Mae Jill B. Carillo, Atty. Mary Dezerie Cazenas, Atty. Mark Espinosa, Atty. Rene Estocapio, Atty. Mary Anne Galanto, Atty. Marilyn Israel, Atty. Rey Magtubo, Atty. Paul Andre Margarico, Atty. Sharon Millan, Atty. Kristin Marie Falallimpa, Atty. Mark Geoffrey Paguntalan, Atty. Ronilo Pamonag, Atty. Ramar Niel Pascua, Atty. Kareen Dela Cruz, Atty. Sherwin Paul Quidato, Atty. Roberto Salazar, Atty. Lorevi Grace Setias, Atty. Marilyn Te, Atty. Jennifer Torril, and Atty. Jerilee Uy.
The new crop of lawyers are a welcome addition to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Iloilo Chapter as it continues to undertake various activities for the benefit and service of the community. We look forward to seeing you in Court!!! By Ian Thomas M. Besana
some of the new Iloilo lawyers
The new Ilonggo lawyers are as follows: From Central Philippine University (CPU) College of Law – Atty. Felizardo D. Amigable, Jr., Atty. Maricel F. Bermejo, Atty. Jeremy D. Delfin, Atty. Felix G. Guarnes, Jr., Atty. Bellatrix O. Legaspi, Atty. Gladys Pearl T. Palabrica, Atty. Erlyn M. Pegarido, Atty. Risha Mae L. Suelo and Atty. Nasty Jones S. Sumagaysay.
From the University of Iloilo (UI) College of Law– Atty. JP Anthony D. Cuñada, Atty. Hernando C. Galvez, Atty. Keenan Rhys Y. Jurilla, and Atty. Geony P. Licera.
From the University of San Augustin (USA) College of Law – Iloilo – Atty. Ma. Carolina T. Advincula, Atty. Princess May Alcarde, Atty. Jelou Almalbis, Atty. Francis Athanasius Ampig, Atty. Maynard Caballero, Atty. Mae Jill B. Carillo, Atty. Mary Dezerie Cazenas, Atty. Mark Espinosa, Atty. Rene Estocapio, Atty. Mary Anne Galanto, Atty. Marilyn Israel, Atty. Rey Magtubo, Atty. Paul Andre Margarico, Atty. Sharon Millan, Atty. Kristin Marie Falallimpa, Atty. Mark Geoffrey Paguntalan, Atty. Ronilo Pamonag, Atty. Ramar Niel Pascua, Atty. Kareen Dela Cruz, Atty. Sherwin Paul Quidato, Atty. Roberto Salazar, Atty. Lorevi Grace Setias, Atty. Marilyn Te, Atty. Jennifer Torril, and Atty. Jerilee Uy.
The new crop of lawyers are a welcome addition to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Iloilo Chapter as it continues to undertake various activities for the benefit and service of the community. We look forward to seeing you in Court!!! By Ian Thomas M. Besana
some of the new Iloilo lawyers
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
